Their response to the Chimberlens

In response to the escalation of the NATO bloc around the Korean peninsula, the neighbors prepared a good answer.


In response to the escalation of the NATO bloc around the Korean peninsula, the neighbors prepared a good answer.

Ale young lady, today is not a day off

It all started with the fact that the usual "call" between the North and South did not take place on the weekend.

Representatives of the two states usually call twice a day, but on Sunday the northerners again did not respond to attempts to contact them, both through special and regular telephone communications. One line operates only on weekdays, while the military gets in touch on weekends, according to a correspondent for The Moscow Post.

And on Saturday morning, North Korean state media reported a successful test of the Hail-2 underwater unmanned system in a variant that simulates nuclear equipment. Conditionally, this can be considered the DPRK's response to the largest bilateral Freedom Shield 2023 (Freedom Shield) exercises in the last five years, which have been held since the beginning of the third week of March in the south of the peninsula. The day before they began, North Korea test-fired two "strategic cruise missiles" from the Gyeongpo-Mansu area of the East (Japan) Sea.

According to the American side, the Freedom Shield exercises were held to strengthen the combined defensive capabilities of the US and Korean armed forces in "constantly changing conditions." The transfer of marine units by sea by the USNS Guam high-speed landing ship from the American base on Okinawa was practiced.

The purpose of the exercise is to work out combined arms actions on command and control in order to reduce the response time in a crisis. Marine Corps spokesman Patrick Maeski said it was about "comprehensive protection of allies and partners as a reserve force for the Indo-Pacific."

It is clear that Pyongyang reacted extremely negatively to these exercises. And for the first time in the history of inter-Korean relations, he announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons against the army of southerners.

Don't tease big neighbours

It is no secret that the US plans remain a forceful solution to the problem of the divided Korean Peninsula. There is talk of the return to the south of the peninsula of American tactical nuclear weapons. In Seoul, they talk about their own nuclear weapons. The head of the South Korean government told the press that Seoul will conduct joint exercises with the United States, regardless of how the DPRK responds to this. While South Korean President Yun Seok-yol proclaimed a strategy of "extended containment" of northerners, ranked the DPRK as a global threat.

At a recent meeting in Moscow, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the PRC supported North Korea, noting that the United States should by real actions respond to the legitimate concerns of the DPRK and create conditions for dialogue. The Russian leader also noted the coincidence of the positions of Moscow and Beijing on the settlement on the Korean Peninsula.

Let's put it bluntly - the settlement should primarily help reduce the risks of nuclear war. The DPRK is already ready to respond to the threat to its security by all means, including nuclear ones. But the threat is growing, the Pentagon is not backing down, Seoul obediently follows. The challenge facing Russia and China is to deter the U.S. and Japan and discipline South Korea.

What should be the real actions of Washington that will remove the "concerns of the DPRK"? Approximately the same as in Europe, if we say that Russia cares. The benchmark is the elimination of military bases and the American (NATO) military presence in the region, for starters on the borders of Russia. In the case of Northeast Asia, we are talking not only about the south of the Korean Peninsula, but also the Japanese islands, Taiwan. But you shouldn't expect this to happen in the foreseeable future.

In Europe, the form of confrontation between Russia and NATO has undergone changes in the direction of confrontation, in which nuclear risks have increased. If something like this happens in Korea, the risks of a nuclear collision could be much higher. It is this factor that is likely to determine the policy of Moscow and Beijing in the region.

A common front of geopolitical problems

We also have to think about the fact that the geopolitical weight of South Korea for Washington, as well as North Korea for Beijing and Moscow is growing. This is happening against the background of the progressive disengagement between China and the United States, as well as the severance of any significant ties between Moscow and Washington. The deputy head of the Russian diplomatic service, Sergei Ryabkov, put it briefly - the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the United States collapsed.

The situation of the DPRK and political relations with Pyongyang with the world around them require increasing attention from Russia and China.

For Russia, the "sanctioned status" of the DPRK contradicts the fact that this is a friendly country, relations with it have been checked by time. On the 77th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation, Vladimir Putin sent congratulations to Kim Jong-un, called for "further building up the entire complex of constructive bilateral ties."

In a response telegram, Kim Jong-un noted that now both countries are "on a common front," said about increasing the level of "strategic and tactical cooperation." The DPRK supports Russia in the conflict with Ukraine, voted against the UN resolution condemning the Russian operation, recognized the DPR and LPR, the entry of new territories into the Russian Federation, and is negotiating economic ties with Donbass.

Never say never

The foreign ministers of the G7 countries in a joint statement indicated that the DPRK will never receive the status of a nuclear power in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They have appealed to Pyongyang to demand nuclear disarmament and offer dialogue, as the US, Japan and South Korea see it.

At the end of June last year, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid, the "three allies" also discussed North Korea. It was the first meeting in five years between the leaders of the United States, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK issue was "woven" into the security strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. Expressing concern about the development of ballistic missiles in the DPRK, as well as a possible decision to conduct a nuclear test, the United States and allies repeated the proposal to "liberate" the Korean Peninsula, or rather the DPRK, from nuclear weapons.

The G7 ministers also appealed to the UN, urging all member countries of the organization to fully and effectively implement the resolutions, and the members of the UN Security Council (read the PRC and the Russian Federation) to follow their obligations. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also calls on the DPRK to "complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization," stressing the importance of this step "to achieve regional peace and stability." There is not a word about the pressure of the United States and allies on Pyongyang.

The task is to at least partially free the DPRK from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council (Security Council). This body unanimously approved resolution 2397 on December 22, 2017, which introduced a new package of restrictions in response to the November 29, 2017 test of a new type of Hwasong-15 ballistic missile.

The first UN Security Council sanctions were imposed on October 14, 2006 in response to a nuclear test on October 9, 2006 (resolution 1718). The sanctions were aimed at eliminating the country's missile and nuclear capabilities:

· on June 12, 2009, in connection with the DPRK's second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, the UN Security Council approved the introduction of additional sanctions (resolution 1874).

· on January 22, 2013, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2087 on the launch of a launch vehicle with a satellite in December 2012, which expanded the restrictions imposed.

· on March 2, 2016, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2270, which tightened sanctions in response to a nuclear test on January 6 and the launch of a satellite missile on February 7.

· November 30, 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to expand sanctions. Resolution 2321 was adopted in response to the nuclear test on September 9, 2016.

· June 2, 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2356 on expanding sanctions in response to the DPRK's ballistic missile launches.

· August 5, 2017, the UN Security Council tightened the sanctions regime in response to the launch of the Hwason-14 intercontinental ballistic missile in July 2017 (resolution 2371).

· September 11, 2017, the UN Security Council adopted a package of sanctions in response to the next nuclear weapons test on September 3, 2017 (resolution 2375).

But the nuclear missile program is developing, and steps towards the concerns of the northerners on the part of the UN, South Korea, Japan, the United States and the West as a whole are not visible. On the contrary, pressure is growing, threats to the security of the DPRK are multiplying.

Pyongyang retorts accusations and threats against it by the fact that the AUKUS alliance (USA, Great Britain, Australia) contradicts the agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and threatens the security of the region.

In May last year, Russia and China used a veto on a vote in the UN Security Council on a draft US resolution proposing to tighten sanctions against the DPRK in connection with the DPRK's March 24, 2022 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, as well as other ballistic missile tests.