"Caribs" are repeated in the form of "farce"
The history of the crisis more than 60 years ago did not teach the United States anything.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov completed a diplomatic tour of Latin America. He held talks with colleagues in Nicaragua, Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba was his last stop before a visit to New York, where the minister will take part in the UN Security Council. Russia is presiding there this month, according to a correspondent for The Moscow Post.
From Havana to the US, there's something mystical about it. A little more than 60 years have passed since Cuba and the Caribbean region were at the epicenter of a dangerous confrontation between the two nuclear powers. The 1962 Caribbean missile crisis, also referred to as the "Cuban," brought to life the first nuclear disarmament negotiations.
In New York, on October 28, 1962, Soviet-American negotiations began with the participation of representatives of Cuba and the UN Secretary General. The negotiations ended with the obligations of the parties. Missiles from the territory of Cuba were withdrawn, assurances of compliance with the territorial inviolability of the island and the Republic of Cuba were received. In confidence, the United States announced the withdrawal of its missiles from Turkey and Italy.
Then there was a tough trade and economic blockade of Cuba. Today, the West is preparing for a total trade blockade of Russia. It is possible that Lavrov's move from Havana to New York will add drama to these sentiments. It will be more accurate to say that the agreements between Moscow and Washington in the field of strategic offensive arms necessary for the world can be stopped.
"Underground" unaccounted for PRO grew
At the UN, Minister Lavrov will continue to talk about multipolarity and changes in the world order, as well as arms control and the state of Russia-US relations. Probably, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and its further fate will also become the subject of attention of the UN Security Council sessions chaired by Russia.
On April 20, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a statement "On the Russian-American START Treaty and the situation that led to the decision to suspend it." The Statement noted that the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms (START) was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011. The extension agreement was concluded on January 26, 2021 in the form of an exchange of notes and entered into force on February 3, 2021.
When signing the Treaty, Russia unilaterally made a statement on missile defense, noting that the Treaty can only operate and be viable in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative increase in US missile defense systems.
The parties at the time of signing and ratification proceeded from "the desire to work on strengthening new strategic relations based on mutual trust, openness, predictability and cooperation." The agreement was developed on a strictly parity basis and in accordance with the principle of indivisible security. This important condition was first enshrined in the preamble to the text of the Treaty.
Secondly, for the purposes of the Treaty, a control mechanism was developed that solves the task of ensuring the irreversibility, verifiability and transparency of the START reduction process. The last, 19th session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was held in October 2021 in Geneva.
The Russian Federation by February 5, 2018 (the reference date for the Treaty) fully fulfilled its obligations to reduce START. Washington also announced the achievement of the agreed total quantitative levels of START. But, as the Russian side notes, this was due to "manipulations."
In particular, by means of an exception of offset of a part American the START, as the "converted" 56 launchers (L) of the Traydent-II ballistic missiles of submarines (BMS), and 41 B-52H heavy bomber (HB). Their "re-equipment" was carried out in such a way that the Russian inspectors couldn't confirm that these the START are in the state unsuitable for use.
Four mine installations of the intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM) which Americans transferred to the category of "educational mines" which isn't provided by the Contract also didn't get to offset.
As a result, excess by the American side of the total quantity allowed by the Contract for the developed and not developed TB, PU MBR and PU BRPL made 101 units. In this regard the Russian side didn't recognize reliability of quantitative indices of means of the START at the disposal of the USA.
Thirdly, Washington didn't react to all these remarks, rejected the offered schemes of settlement. The USA de facto didn't execute the Contract, the established limits of the START were exceeded by them.
Boors with "obvious order"
The United States provoked a sharp aggravation of bilateral relations, headed for a malicious escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, called for Russia to be "strategically defeated" in an all-out hybrid war. The United States led a campaign to undermine the security of the Russian Federation, its political and economic "strangulation." NATO countries have declared the North Atlantic bloc a "nuclear alliance," in their strategic planning they have strengthened their emphasis on nuclear weapons, announced a further increase in the combat readiness of nuclear arsenals "assigned" to NATO, and began to practice "joint nuclear missions."
In conditions when it comes to further escalation of the conflict with Russia, one cannot but take into account the "factor of the combined nuclear arsenal" of the three NATO nuclear states - the USA, Great Britain and France.
All this has fundamentally changed the security conditions compared to those in which START was developed and signed. The United States undermined the basic principles, as well as general political and military-strategic understandings that are enshrined in the Treaty and without which it would not have been concluded.
In particular, the United States defiantly violated the principle of indivisibility of security, disavowed the recognition of the START-missile defense relationship recorded in the Treaty. The importance of missile defense increases against the background of the degradation of the military-strategic situation.
In 2022, through the fault of the United States, additional obstacles appeared to the resumption of inspection activities under the Treaty, including the termination of normal passenger flights, the closure of the airspace of Western countries for aircraft of the Russian Ministry of Defense with inspectors, visa problems, blocking payment instruments, and more. All this made it impossible for Russia to conduct inspections in the United States.
In August 2022, the United States escalated and tried to send its inspection group to Russia in an apparent manner. Under these conditions, Moscow temporarily removed Russian objects subject to inspections from verification activities, which is allowed by paragraph 5 of Section I of Chapter 5 of the Protocol to the Contract.
Additional disagreements arose regarding the functioning of the DKK.
By the time the parties were able to advance in the preparation of the DKK session in Cairo in November-December 2022, the issue had lost its relevance due to political decisions made by the Russian side against the backdrop of further aggravation of bilateral relations.
An additional factor was the series of strikes inflicted by the Kyiv regime on Russian strategic facilities covered by the Treaty. These attacks were carried out with the military-technical and intelligence-information assistance of Washington.
"In aggregate," but there are nuances
The Russian side came to the conclusion of a significant violation of the START Treaty committed by the United States. Such as is of fundamental importance for the implementation of the object and objectives of the Agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 21 announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the suspension of the START Treaty. On February 28, the relevant Federal Law came into force.
On February 21, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a statement that Moscow will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions provided for by START within the term of the Treaty, will continue to participate in the exchange of notifications on ICBM and SLBM launches, and will follow the 1989 Agreement on Mutual Advance Notifications of Major Strategic Exercises.
The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that the decision to suspend the START Treaty is reversible, provided that the United States abandons an aggressive course to undermine Russia's security, takes practical steps towards real de-escalation, creates the necessary technical conditions for the functioning of the Treaty, and notes that Russia will take into account the nuclear capabilities of Great Britain and France.
The American authorities should reconsider their hostile policy and abandon the increase in threats to Russia's national security to resume the functioning of the START Treaty, "said Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov in a commentary to Newsweek magazine.
There are statements from the White House that Washington will not stop "adding fuel to the fire" of the Ukrainian crisis, the ambassador continued. "Apparently, resolving the START issue is not a priority for the [US] administration. Such a choice is regrettable. However, such logic fully fits into the long-term course of the United States to collapse the arms control regime, "Antonov said.
The diplomat assured that Moscow "will not follow the American example." "We remain committed to a responsible approach in the field of strategic stability," Antonov said. We assume that these measures are enough to ensure predictability in the relations of the largest nuclear powers. "