"Security Game": Russia is waiting for a written response from the United States
The current tactics of the American White House are increasingly reminiscent of the situation with the Caribbean crisis in 1962.
Against the background of the approach of additional NATO forces to the borders of the Union State, the topic of Kremlin response is being discussed. Spokesman for the Russian president Dmitry Peskov said: Russia is considering various options for ensuring its own security if Moscow's proposals, transmitted last year by the United States and NATO, do not find understanding. The White House will then put America's security at stake.
What is it, "America's security"? And is it realistic to expect a "written answer" from someone who sees himself only at the head of the negotiating (or playing) table?
And the game, meanwhile, is already underway. A mass departure of Western diplomats from Kiev was organized. The supply of weapons and ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine continues. NATO forces on the western borders of Russia and Belarus also came into motion. Washington could cite growing tensions to delay its "written response." Or go to a provocation in the Donbass so as not to give an answer at all.
Before the game
The White House, as an experienced, cynical manipulator, prepared once again not to sit at the negotiating table, not to turn the table. He set out with the help of a substitution of concepts to come out "dry" from a puddle of his own lies and mistakes. Played panic, classic "forgetfulness," toxic Russophobic information background, sophisticated methods of distraction, as well as speckled decks of terms help.
In general, the player is still the same, there is nowhere to put a sample. But the stakes are high for Joe Biden's administration. For starters, the upcoming midterm congressional elections this year. Further - 2024, presidential elections. And the security of the United States itself, but this is then. While there is a "security game" of others - for example, Ukraine.
The White House agrees: an experienced player sits opposite. Moscow, as a partner, in the past, Washington managed to openly "throw," violating the right and treaties, as well as to cheat quietly. But the Kremlin on December 15, 2021 again handed over the cards, waiting for a written response. Moscow would like to avoid an unknown response.
Fright at Freud
According to The New York Times, Russia may respond to the approach of NATO forces to its borders by deploying military infrastructure and "certain weapons systems in unspecified places." Experts say this. Sometimes the situation is compared with the Caribbean crisis of 1962. Last year, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reminded reporters of this.
But nothing concrete on the content of possible retaliatory measures by Russia on threats to its security has yet been heard. It is all the more noteworthy that presidential adviser Jake Sullivan, answering a media question and saying that in Geneva "they did not discuss this topic," and threatened to "decisively understand" if it comes to the Russian armed forces in Latin America. A scare in advance, like Freud...
The Caribbean (Cuban) crisis of 1962, Mr. Sullivan, like many journalists to whose questions he answered, perceives it "frontally," in the form in which 60 years later, he is remembered in America. Or learned in Russia. So, for example, according to RIA Novosti, it was such a "sharp aggravation of the international situation, caused by the threat of war between the USSR and the USA due to the deployment of Soviet missile weapons in Cuba."
What caused the Caribbean Crisis
In fact, "inside" of the Caribbean Crisis is known not to all. Can help to understand how "the American brains" are arranged. The hidden details of a cataclysm help to finish thinking as decisions of the White House could influence further events in the world. Specification of a situation of that time gives the chance to present the course of "the American political thought" at the heart of which there is a facade, readiness to use a lie and forgery.
Crisis around the Soviet rockets in Cuba became a part of a long chain of events which the White House spun in relation to the Kremlin, since 1945. The strategy of destruction of the USSR was its cornerstone. Start of "Satellite" caused on November 4, 1957 panic in the USA. And on nuclear missile "string" of Washington new knots appeared. Began with placement in 1961 in Great Britain of ballistic missiles of intermediate range of "Torahs" (60 rockets). Followed them - Jupiter in Italy (30 rockets) and Turkey (15 rockets). Both those, and others were suitable for drawing nuclear attack on the western regions of the Soviet Union.
Stationary medium-range missiles of "Torahs" were developed in Great Britain in December, 1957. In June, 1960 to them brought the 1.44 thermonuclear military units of Mt everyone. Deactivation of a system took place from November, 1962 to August, 1963 in exchange for withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet rockets.
Mass production of mobile medium-range missiles Jupiter began in August, 1958. (On 15 rockets) agreed to their placement Italy - in March, 1958 and Turkey - in October, 1959. Preparation of the Italian and Turkish calculations began in 1959 and came to the end in the middle of 1961. By May, 1962 both countries fully completed national rocket parts, warheads remained under control of Americans. The Caribbean Crisis led to the fact that by August, 1963 all these rockets from Italy and Turkey were taken out too.
On the basis of an open part of archives of administration of John Kennedy the researchers draw conclusions about that, this U.S. President personally took the main responsibility for the beginning of a Cuban Missile Crisis. As that crisis came to the end, long was shrouded in mystery. Moreover Kennedy's administration then consciously kept Americans in dark of rather tenfold superiority of the USA over the Soviet Union on number of carriers of nuclear warheads.
Curve mirror of crisis
Despite differences in quantity and, speak, as these arms and also in geography of basing of carriers, John Kennedy conducted an election campaign under the slogan of criticism of administration of Eisenhower-Nixon. He accused her that the imbalance in the field of nuclear missile arms in favor of the USSR was allowed.
Moscow, meanwhile, suspected the USA of preparation for drawing the first nuclear attack. For Khrushchev, the American Jupiter rockets in Italy and Turkey became a powerful argument to set the Soviet rockets to Cuba.
It is curious that in the first day of aggravation, October 16, 1962, reflecting on Khrushchev's motives to place rockets in Cuba, Kennedy made the stunning remark. He asked subordinates: "But why he put them there? … It is all the same, as though we suddenly began to place a large number of ballistic missiles of average range in Turkey. This would be devilishly dangerous, I think". On what Makdzhordzh Bundy, the adviser for national security, specified: "Mister president, we already made it".
Maxwell Taylor, the head of Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed what a main objective of deployment of rockets in Cuba was "to add quite imperfect system of intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM)" of Councils. Kennedy in the first day of crisis practically agreed that he "doesn't matter whether MBR flying from the USSR, or that that in 90 miles from here will blow up. The geography means not so much".
Eventually, the Soviet submarines with rockets onboard too could be near coast of the USA, and they at the same time were less noticeable and vulnerable. All in a circle of advisers kind of agreed that rockets in Cuba of strategic balance of advantage of the USSR don't change, as well as don't belittle ability of the USA to strike the first nuclear attack. In group of advisers the rockets of special concern didn't cause that is confirmed by archive materials.
The consent of the Cuban leaders to place rockets in the territory was represented lawful too. What caused crisis, so this decision of Kennedy to enter "quarantine" of the island state, having put forward ultimatums to both Moscow, and Havana. Robert McNamara in 1987 explained: "You have to remember that from the very beginning the president Kennedy told that for us it is politically unacceptable to leave these rocket objects alone. He didn't tell "militarily", he told "in political".
Later the friend Kennedy John Kenneth Galbraith told: "As soon as [rockets] appeared there, political priorities of administration of Kennedy induced her to run practically any risks that to move away them". The assistant to the Secretary of State Edwin Martin called it "a psychological factor". It was unacceptable if we "were idle and allowed them to do it with us". Visibility of determination was more important than direct threat.
Despite rather tolerant threat of this factor of safety of the USA, the decision of the White House on the Soviet rockets in Cuba came down to reasons of political prestige. The USA couldn't be reconciled with presence of the Soviet rockets on the island, proceeding from the fact that their allies and opponents could interpret it as manifestation of weakness.
Really, for Washington the reasons of prestige and authority were the main cause for which Kennedy ran risks of nuclear war. Someone from the American intellectuals called it "a school view of world politics". The cockiness outweighed need of sober assessment of strategic realities.
Later, it "school understanding" by Washington situations in Cuba dictated other foreign policy "feats" to the USA. Washington launched wars to support the authority. Instead of supporting him, preventing the conflicts, - Benjamin Schwartz, the American editor and the writer, the author of article "writes The Real Cuban Missile Crisis. Everything you think you know about those 13 days is wrong", The Real Cuban Missile Crisis - The Atlantic (The real Cuban Missile Crisis. Everything that you think that you know about these 13 days, is incorrect).
Simple confidential decision
The USA considered invasion option to Cuba to destroy the Soviet rockets, and even took the island in a ring of naval blockade. Washington and Moscow put the troops on high alert. In Cuba began to dig air-raid shelters.
The agreement on mutual refusal of rockets in Turkey, Italy and in Cuba looked in these pre-war conditions as quite simple decision. Seeking to break an impasse, on October 27, 1962 Khrushchev addressed Kennedy, reminded him of rockets in Turkey, offered the transaction. In the answer that noted that the Soviet leader made "the state and wise decision" to remove the rockets, but in Turkey at the same time didn't mention rockets.
According to events, widespread administration of Kennedy and subsequently accepted, in quality "historical the fact", Washington categorically rejected the offer of Moscow. The Soviet Union was forced to remove the rockets unilaterally "thanks to Kennedy's determination". It was deception!
In the late eighties earlier closed archives became available. Some participants of events wished to tell the truth too, at last. It became clear that the crisis was really solved in the way of the arrangement hidden from the public on the Jupiter rockets and the Soviet rockets. Kennedy, however, threatened to cancel the transaction if Moscow discloses her content. He made it for the same reasons which generated crisis. On the first place for it there was a domestic policy and the international image of the USA.
Collateral victims of the transaction
Only the handful of officials of administration of Kennedy knew about it. Most of members of his president's team, including the vice president Lyndon Johnson, didn't know about it. Robert McNamara and Dean Rask who were informed lied later to the Congress. Kennedy and his colleagues offered political future of the ambassador of the USA in the UN Adlai Stephenson who offered the settlement agreement and exchange of Cuba to Turkey. As his chiefs told then, the transaction of "type of Munich". The transaction which as the administration loudly claimed, she would never allow!
Though Kennedy actually agreed to "exchange", heritage of this policy at the head of which there was an image, it was harmful. Having successfully hidden the transaction from the vice president, from generation of foreign policy figures and strategists and also from the American public, Kennedy and his team put such concepts to the base of strategy of national security of the USA as "the hardness and force" in the face of "threats and aggression", not very well real or imaginary. In this deal of a reason of image dictated both political estimates, and behavior of Washington in world affairs.
Began to refer everything that could force to doubt allies determination of America to category of threats of the USA. This policy led to accident in Vietnam and Iraq, to adventures in Syria and Libya, to flight from Afghanistan. Today reasons of prestige and authority defines policy of the White House in Europe, in East Asia and the western part of the Pacific Ocean. The broad concept of safety, including reasons of prestige and a facade of indispensability, struck both democratic, and republican politicians, both liberals, and conservatives, became fundamentals of foreign policy of the USA.